Mathias Czaika, Heidrun Bohnet, and Federica Zardo

Disentangling the European Migration Policy-Mix since 1990

Deliverable 5.5

QuantMig has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 870299.

History of changes

Version	Date	Changes
1.0	5 November 2021	Issued for Consortium Review
1.1	30 November 2021	First version submitted as official deliverable to the EC

Suggested citation

Czaika M, H Bohnet and F Zardo (2021) The Evolution of the European Migration Policy-Mix. QuantMig Project Deliverable D5.5.

Dissemination level

PU Public

Acknowledgments

Our special thanks go to Simona Schreier and Lucas Skrabal for their diligent work on the DEMIG-QuantMig European Migration Policy database. We further appreciate comments and feedback on this paper by Jakub Bijak, Jackie Wahba, and Valentina Di Iasio. This document reflects the authors' view and the Research Executive Agency of the European Commission are not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

Cover photo: iStockphoto.com/Guenter Guni

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic shows once again: policies addressing and affecting human migration and mobility both *explicitly* and *implicitly* are inherently and mutually intertwined (Czaika, Erdal and Talleraas 2021). Simultaneously, the effects and effectiveness of migration policies are influenced by a multitude of other public policies including healthcare, welfare, labour, economic or foreign policies. Migration governance systems are characterized by a range of policy instruments for attracting, admitting, selecting, controlling, or deterring migrants, but often ignore the relevance of other state policies in shaping migration processes.

While acknowledging the interconnected nature of migration policy and governance systems, scholars have rarely tried to analyze whether and how multiple migration-relevant policies co-evolve in a systematic and coordinated way. This paper aims to fill this gap by asking whether internal and external migration-relevant policies develop in similar directions in terms of their restrictiveness, and, to what extent various migration-relevant policy instruments describe patterns of policy convergence or divergence?

Combining several policy datasets on internal and external migration policies, but also on other policies with migration-relevance, this paper disentangles migration policy configurations in and across 31 European states between 1990 and 2020. We identify both so-called *categorical* interlinkages as well as *spatial* dependence in the formation and evolution of migration policy instruments forming broader migration-relevant policy configurations (Czaika, Bohnet and Soto-Nishimura 2021). Consequently, such migration 'policy packages' need to be considered if wanting to understand the formation of European migration governance system which is based on the interplay of a multitude of internal and external policy areas and instruments.

The next section provides a conceptualisation of the European migration policy mix understood as complex configurations of multiple internal and external policy instruments with migration relevance. We further elaborate on four fundamental hypotheses that address, on the one hand, the interplay of multiple policy instruments with each other, and on the other, are able to shape either explicitly or implicitly, yet conjointly, migration patterns and outcomes. Section 3 introduces some key policy areas that we consider as integral elements of a comprehensive configuration of migration-relevant policies. A description of migration policy trends is followed in Section 4 by a more rigorous assessment of spatial and categorical dependence in migration-relevant policy instruments. Section 5 concludes.

The analysis shows that the European migration policy mix is a configuration of policies that seem to develop rather independently from each other in rather incoherent directions – both within as well as between European destination countries. Yet a closer analysis identifies some striking patterns of convergence and co-evolution of some 'functionally proximate' policy areas while more 'functionally distant' policies seem less integrated or coordinated. That is, despite efforts for greater harmonisation in some policy areas or some policy instruments, the broader European 'migration policy regime' is still rather fragmented, and a multitude of migration-relevant policies follow only weakly a policy coherent trend within and across Europe states.

2. Migration policy-mix in the making: domains, drivers and interlinkages

2.1 The politics of internal and external migration policy changes

Migration policies naturally emerged with the formation of the Westphalian nation state and its attempt to control the movement of population (Torpey 1998). Policy making in this realm was initially aimed at limiting the departure, or facilitating the arrival, of a vital workforce, before shifting towards the regulation and control of immigration of foreigners since the mid-1970s (Czaika and De Haas 2013; Haas and Vezzoli 2011; Zolberg 1989). While it is acknowledged that migration policies "evolve over longer time periods" (Czaika 2020, 299), there is little doubt that over the past decades the landscape of regulations, laws and processes seeking to govern international migration has become "richer", i.e., more complex and fragmented, involving a growing array of state and non-state actors establishing and utilizing a toolbox of policy instruments for addressing multiple political objectives on issues related to the migration and integration of an increasingly mobile population. The formation and changes of 'migration-relevant policies' have occurred in various directions and speeds, across and between countries and migrant categories, and across governance levels, be they local, regional, national or supranational. The burgeoning literature on migration governance reflects this trend, and studies have evolved from trying to explain distinct migration policies (for an overview, see Weinar, Bonjour, and Zhyznomirska 2018), their drivers (Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011; de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015), outcomes and impact (De Haas and Czaika 2015; Lutz 2019), to describing and categorizing varying degrees of complexity through the concepts of policy regimes and policy mixes, to measuring and assessing policy change.

The formation and change of so-called internal and external migration policies has been observed along different dimensions. With internal migration policies we refer here to those policies that aim to target migrants *within* the nation state or country, while external migration policies are implemented and/or create impact outside the national boundaries. Policy making, it has been noticed, could be driven by factors linked to the social dynamics of the migratory process (Castles 2004, 857). For instance, admission and temporary residence policies might be the result of policymakers' understandings of the migration phenomenon as a rational assessment of individuals seeking to maximize their utility (Elsner and Zimmermann 2016; Scholten and Penninx 2016). Migration policies in Europe have also evolved as part of the European integration process whereby member states have gradually created a free movement framework and harmonized asylum and reception policies (Geddes 2021). The European migration policy dynamism can be also related to institutional developments at the EU level, since an increasing number of supranational actors now take part in the policy process, such as different Directorates General of the Commission, the new European Asylum Support Office (the future European Asylum Agency), the Fundamental Rights agency or international organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Indeed, actors at multiple levels bring their own agendas and trigger national policy change.

The interaction between economic and security-related migration drivers are commonly used to explain external policies, that is to say, policies "designed for implementation and impact outside of the borders of the policy-making state" (Czaika, Erdal, and Talleraas 2021, 4). More recently, however, the externalization debate has highlighted how failures to reform internal policies, such as the Dublin regulation on asylum processing, may lead to developments in areas such as return and

readmission, which directly affect and involve non-EU countries (Lavenex 2006; Trauner 2016; Kasparek 2016).

While recognizing its complexity, most of the research on the politics of European migration policies, has focused on sub-fields or, whenever engaging with interlinkages, it has looked at specific 'policy pairs', such as migration-related aid interventions (Lanati and Thiele 2018), admission and citizenship policies (Balch and Geddes 2012), or policies on return and readmission (Stutz and Trauner 2021). The focus on some single policy areas, such as asylum, family, or labour migration policies, tends to lose sight of the overall functionality of comprehensive immigration policy regimes.

In order to make sense of the "complexification" (Scholten 2020) of migration policies, intended as the transformation of issue characteristics of migration and the growing interlinkages between policy instruments, scholars have increasingly relied on the notions of policy regimes and policy mixes. Although "regime" is not a unified concept, regime terminology has become rather widespread in migration research (Horvath, Amelina, and Peters 2017). Whether building on International Relations theories (Samers 2016), on social policy theorizing (Sciortino 2004) or adopting a Foucauldian perspective (Haahr and Walters 2004; Genova and Peutz 2010), this approach has allowed highlighting the interplay between migration and other regulatory sources, actors and practices, such as welfare systems (Sciortino 2004) or the labour market (Clark et al. 2019).

It is argued, however, that these analyses have not lived up with their promises of comprehensiveness and comparability (Boucher and Gest 2015; Schultz, Lutz, and Simon 2021), and this mostly because of the lack of clear indicators to categorize and compare migration regimes. Moreover, there have been very few attempts (Boucher and Gest 2015) to understand the drivers of migration regimes and to measure their variation.

Against these limitations, we agree with Schultz et al. (2021) who claim that the notion of policy-mixes is better suited to gauge and explain the multi-dimensional character of migration policies. Drawing on the macro-economic policy field, a policy-mix is intended as the combination of instruments that affect migration patterns. This approach therefore assumes that migration policies should be analyzed by looking at the interaction between sub-policy fields and among different – and sometimes competing – rationales that drive sub-policy making. As rightly argued by Schultz et al. (ibid), in migration research the concept of policy-mix also allows addressing the contradiction between the search for increasing openness prompted by globalization and liberalism, and restrictive tendencies driven by rising anti-immigrant public attitudes or right-wing coalitions, which is known as "liberal paradox" (Hollifield 2004). The conceptualization of migration policies as policy-mixes leaves room for these co-existing logics, objectives and actions to be assessed and explained.

Indeed, some existing research endeavors to measure whether migration policies have become more restrictive, or if more liberal have proliferated. Claims of increasing restrictiveness of policies targeting migration towards Europe, which are well exemplified by the Fortress Europe metaphor and by the externalization and securitization trends (de Haas 2008; Geddes and Taylor 2016; Zardo and Loschi 2020; Bialasiewicz 2012) have been counterbalanced by more liberal portrays of regulatory frameworks for asylum seekers, refugees and migrants regularly residing in EU countries (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Sasse 2005). Based on their analysis of the DEMIG POLICY database, covering policy changes in 45 countries, de Haas et al. (2015) argue that overall, migration policies have become less restrictive over the past decades. They also show, however, the extent to which

contemporary migration policies have become highly differentiated according to specific migrant categories and call for the need to "consider such different types of policies separately, in addition to aggregating them" (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015, 27). In this respect, the concept of policy-mix is instrumental in pushing forward the understanding of migration policies as aggregates of sub-policy fields and in explaining their development over time and space.

This paper assumes that, first, European migration policy mixes are not only composed by internal and external policies directly targeting "migratory behaviour of a target population in an intended direction" (Czaika, Erdal, and Talleraas 2021, 2), but also by other migration-relevant state policies. These 'non-migration policies', that is public policies in areas such as health, labour market, or development aid, are capable of implicitly (and indirectly) but sustainably shaping migration patterns and process.
Second, we conceive migration policy packages not just as unstructured sets of multiple instruments, but as configurations of policies with an integral functional relationship. Our endeavour is to theorize interlinkages between internal and external migration policies, and between migration and migration-relevant policies within and beyond the countries´ territories and borders. In doing so, we gradually move from the more static concept of policy-mix towards the more fine-grained notion of configuration wherein policies can influence, i.e., mediate, reinforce, counteract or neutralize, each other. We therefore capture not only how policy-mixes do co-evolve along the restrictive-liberal spectrum across countries and over time, but also assess functional interlinkages and identify spatial, categorical, and temporal dependencies. Eventually, we move on to exploring the drivers of the policy formation process to understand shifts and changes in complex policy configurations.

2.2 Co-evolution of migration and migration-relevant polices

It is widely recognized that migration policies are not independent from each other: they are part of broad packages pursuing different, and sometimes contradicting, goals (Castles 2004; Czaika, Erdal, and Talleraas 2021). The interaction between different policies and different instruments, however, has not been thoroughly studied (Haas et al. 2019). To disentangle policy-mixes, we may distinguish four levels of interaction and complexity. The first has to do with categorical interlinkages, that is, associations between policies operating *within* the internal and the external domains of migration and migration-relevant policies. The second level is still composed by interlinkages within a country´s policy-mix but describes interactions *between* migration and migration-relevant policies. Indeed, it is increasingly argued that migration outcomes are not only shaped by policies that are specifically intended to have a migration consequence, but also by those that are not specifically designed and implemented for migration management purposes (Czaika, Erdal, and Talleraas 2021; Kuschminder and Koser 2017; Haas and Vezzoli 2011). The third layer of interaction acknowledges the growing relevance of the external dimension of European migration policies (Graae Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006) and hypothesizes policy linkages between the internal and external policy domains. The fourth layer conjectures on the interaction among policy-mixes *across* countries, drawing on propositions of the policy coherence and policy diffusion literature.

Categorical interlinkages within the internal migration policy-mix

The first linkage that we explore is the one between those policies aimed at attracting and integrating migrants and those aiming to deter or return migrants. Securing the border is often seen as a prerequisite for states to liberalize their policies on rights to stay and integrate in a dynamic which has been captured by the "number versus rights" logic. Ruhs and Martin hypothesize that states´ choices are driven by a trade-off whereby admitting more migrant workers and offering them

relatively few rights is cost-effective (Ruhs and Martin 2008). Following a similar logic, we conceptualize the relationship between policies seeking to attract and those seeking to control migration as being driven by a "less migration, more rights" rationale. We therefore test the key proposition of the "numbers versus rights" model and expect to find that:

> *H1*) Increasing liberalisation (restriction) of admission and integration policies is associated with increased restrictiveness (liberalisation) of border and return policies.

Categorical interlinkages between migration and migration-relevant policies

As noted above, migration outcomes are not only the result of policies directly targeting migration. There is, indeed, a vast array of policies whose focus is not migration management per se, but whose objectives are otherwise, but their impact nevertheless affects migration drivers, processes and outcomes. Hence, migration-relevant policies are those that "have a direct or indirect effect on migration, no matter whether they are established for a migration-related objective, or not" (Czaika, Erdal, and Talleraas 2021, 35). While not directly engaging with the concept of migration-relevant policy, research has already tackled these types of interlinkages. The welfare magnet hypothesis (Borjas 1999), for instance, conjectures on the effect that the existence of the welfare state, and the magnitude of welfare benefits, might have on the quantity and composition of migration flows, claiming that more generous welfare provisions tend to attract (relatively more low-skilled) migrants (Razin and Wahba 2015; Allard and Danziger 2000). On a similar note, but with a focus on the external dimension of migration, there is consensus in the literature that the effect of foreign aid on migration flows is positive (Lanati and Thiele 2018; Parsons and Winters 2014; Berthélemy, Beuran, and Maurel 2009). Despite this evidence, the debate highlights that policy-makers tend to strategically use welfare or aid policies, but also foreign, military, or climate policy as viable instruments to strengthen migration control (Thiele and Lanati 2018). Conditional foreign aid, for instance, has become a tool to overcome third countries reluctance to cooperate on readmission (Cassarino 2010; İçduygu and Aksel 2014; Zardo 2017). We therefore hypothesize for both internal and external policy domains that:

> *H2)* Direct migration policies that explicitly aim to control migration are interdependent of or mediated by other indirect migration-relevant policies and may conjointly either constrain or enhance migration opportunities for potential migrants.

We therefore expect to find no clear (or, an ambiguous) association between migration and migration-relevant policies.

Interdependence of internal and external migration policies

Trends of migration policy making in Europe indicate that states have become increasingly active in the so-called external dimension of their migration policies. Scholars have labelled this phenomenon the "externalisation" of migration policy, which has triggered a burgeoning academic debate. In her analysis of the EU migration agenda, Lavenex points to the shift towards extraterritorial control as being "less a new phenomenon than the continuation of the transgovernmental logic of cooperation" (Lavenex 2006, 330). She agrees, however, on external policies as being strictly interconnected with internal migration policies because they serve as an "escape road" for internal policy constraints. The link between external and internal migration policies has been also conceptualized as "internal-external security nexus" (Trauner and Carrapiço 2012), based on the idea that the EU may increase its problem-solving capacity in relation to the fight against irregular migration, by strengthening cooperation with third countries (Trauner and Carrapiço 2012; Graee Gammeltoft-Hansen 2006; Bigo

2014). Following the "escape" logic, we expect states to rely on restrictive external migration policies as a pre-condition for pursuing more liberal internal policies. We conjecture that:

> *H3)* Increased restrictiveness (liberalisation) of the external policy mix is associated with increased liberalisation (restrictions) of the internal policy mix within each EU country.

Spatial convergence of migration policies

A prominent hypothesis in the immigration politics literature is that countries' immigration policies have become increasingly similar over time because of internal and external constraints (Hollifield et al. 2014; Meyers 2002). Moreover, policies might not only have evolved in a certain direction but may also have become more similar over time, either in a liberal or a restrictive way. This line of argument follows the policy diffusion debate (Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2019; Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013), according to which policy choices are interdependent, and a choice made by one decision-maker influences, by means of several types of mechanisms, the choices made by other decision-makers, and is in turn influenced by them. As done elsewhere (Czaika, Bohnet, and Soto-Nishimura 2021), we assume that convergence might be stronger among countries that are geographically close. We hypothesize that changes in certain policy areas in one EU country are influenced by policy changes in the same areas in other geographically proximate countries. This may basically hold for both the internal and the external policy domains. Hence:

> *H4)* Increasingly restrictive (liberal) internal (external) policies are associated with increasingly restrictive (liberal) internal (external) policy-mix in geographically proximate countries.

To identify whether internal and external policies have followed similar or dissimilar trajectories over the past three decades, we will, first, use descriptive statistics in section 3 to determine patterns across different migration policy areas and, second, in section 4, conduct panel regression analyses to identify the existence of categorical and spatial interlinkages more rigorously.

3. European migration-relevant policies: data and patterns

The following section describes some key patterns and features of the European policy-mix as a set of multiple external and internal migration and migration-relevant policy instruments.

3.1 Internal policies

Internal migration policy areas include here border, admission, integration and return policies as these are commonly agreed to be the key internal migration policy instruments (de Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2015). The measures of these policy areas originate from the recently extended DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database (Quantmig 2021) which covers the European Union member states plus the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, thus 31 countries, for the period 1990 to 2020. Following the example of the original DEMIG POLICY database (2015), the DEMIG-QuantMig indicators of policy measures are coded according to the policy area, as well as changes in restrictiveness they introduce in the existing legal system. It represents either a change towards more, or less restrictiveness within the existing legal system, i.e., the reference point for identifying a legal change is always the respective legal status quo. The effectiveness of policies implemented by national governments is assessed in moments of policy change and against the criterion whether and to what extent migration policy change may affect migration in the intended way. The database covers 5131 policy changes within the period 1990 to 2020 of which most took place in the area of admission policies (3198) followed by policy adaptations in the area of integration (872), border policy (570) and 491 policy changes in the area of return (Table 1).

Table 1 Number of policy changes by area, direction, and magnitude of change, 1990-2020

Policy area / Direction of change / Magnitude of change	Major change	Mid-level change	Minor change	Fine-tuning change	Total # of changes
Border policy	**186**	**98**	**109**	**177**	**570**
Less restrictive	29	3	10	4	**46**
More restrictive	149	94	90	168	**501**
No change*	8	1	9	5	**23**
Admission policy	**396**	**904**	**767**	**1131**	**3198**
Less restrictive	216	646	466	781	**2109**
More restrictive	144	217	258	298	**917**
No change*	36	41	43	52	**172**
Integration policy	**260**	**178**	**278**	**156**	**872**
Less restrictive	184	123	164	115	**586**
More restrictive	70	53	88	37	**248**
No change*	6	2	26	4	**38**
Return policy	**48**	**257**	**59**	**127**	**491**
Less restrictive	25	32	14	20	**91**
More restrictive	16	225	40	107	**388**
No change*	7		5		**12**
Total # of changes	**890**	**1437**	**1213**	**1591**	**5131**

Note: (*) Includes changes where direction cannot be assessed.

With regard to the change in policy restrictiveness, which entails introducing a new policy measure compared to the previous situation, it is an ordinal variable assessing the relative change in restrictiveness in one of the four policy areas border, admission, integration, and return. This policy change variable has three values [−1, 0, +1]. A policy change is recorded if a policy extended or restricted the rights attributed to a target migrant group.[1]

In addition, the DEMIG-QuantMig database also includes a variable to capture the magnitude of the policy change. This variable assesses on a four-level scale whether a particular policy change constitutes a 'fine-tuning change' (+/−1), 'minor change' (+/−2), 'mid-level change' (+/−3) or 'major change' (+/−4).[2]

3.1.1. Policy Dynamics and Change Intensity

Inventing, adapting, or readjusting policy objectives and their implementation are the 'raison d'être' of national governments and the administrative apparatus. In the area of migration, policy changes are a frequent phenomenon with sometimes several policy adjustments per year that affect and regulate the means and conditions of a (native and foreign) migrant population for entering, staying, integrating, leaving, or returning. The more than 5000 policy changes that are recorded in the DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database are hereby unevenly distributed across the 31 European countries, but also over time and by their magnitude and direction.

First, policy intensities in terms of the number of changes per year varies significantly over time and across countries. Periods of relative policy stability reflected by rather few (Figure 1) or relative minor (Figure 2) migration policy changes are frequently interrupted by major policy shifts implemented by larger policy packages. These policy packages are usually mixed bags of new regulations and measures which are either implemented after a change in government and/or after an often long and tedious discourse and decision-making process. Major immigration reforms usually bundle a range of new measures that combine more liberal regulations in some areas with more restrictive measures in other areas (Czaika and De Haas 2013). Migration policy priorities and objectives are shaped in a context of multiple and usually competing policy and political interests and agendas of politicians, voters, and various interest groups (Boswell 2007).

[1] Measures that restricted the rights of a migrant group were coded +1 (policy change towards more restrictiveness compared to the status quo policy), while measures intending to extend the rights of a migrant group were coded −1 (policy change towards less restrictiveness compared to the policy before). The code 0 (no change in the level of restrictiveness or a change cannot be assessed) was used in two policy scenarios: (i) when a completely new regulative (selection) system was introduced whose restrictiveness cannot be compared to the previous legal framework – such as the introduction of a points-based system into a labour migration regime that was previously demand-driven; (ii) for measures whose impact on rights cannot be assessed because changes affect non-coded dimensions (particularly age and gender groups, for example unaccompanied minors was such a group) (cf. DEMIG Codebook (2015)).

[2] The DEMIG-QuantMig coding methodology followed the same procedure as outlined in the DEMIG POLICY codebook (2015) which specifies detailed definitions of the various codes.

Figure 1 Total number of internal migration policy changes per year, by country



Data source: DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database (2021). Own elaboration.

Figure 2 indicates that in none of the 31 European countries a steady and robust long-term policy trend in the policy direction existed over the past three decades. We rather observe migration policy cycles where in some years policy changes towards more restrictive regulations dominate but are followed by periods of more liberal policy adjustments. For instance, the Czech Republic had a series of liberal policy changes in the early 1990s (and to some extent also in the mid-2000s) which had been interrupted by more restrictive policy adaptations in the later 1990s and the early 2000s. Slovenia, on the other hand, turned more restrictive in the 1990s and only liberalised moderately after the mid-2000s. However, beyond these larger policy trends, it is a matter of fact that in any of these periods both constraining and facilitating migration policy changes are bundled together, obviously with some intertemporal dominance of either liberal or restrictive policy changes.

Across all 31 European countries, Figure 3 displays that the policy activity in terms of the average number of policy changes per year and country can be estimated by as a continuously rising trend. While the DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database identifies less than four policy changes per year during the 1990s, this number has more than doubled for the 2010s. The post-2015 period was hereby a period of exceptionally intense political dynamic with high policy adaptation activity in most countries. At the same time, the significance or magnitude of policy changes has developed in the opposite direction. Policy changes in the 1990s have been – on average – of greater significance regarding the rights of migrants than those in the 2000s. Moreover, policy adaptations during the past decade have been predominantly fine-tuning changes (Figure 3).

Figure 2 Internal migration policy changes by magnitude and direction, by country and year



Data source: DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database (2021). Own elaboration.

Figure 3 Total number of internal migration policy changes per year, by country



Data source: DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database (2021). Own elaboration.

3.1.2. Trends in internal migration policies

The raw scores of our policy variables do not assess the absolute level of restrictiveness of a specific policy within a country. However, when we aggregate all (magnitude-weighted) policy changes and standardise with regard to a reference year (in our case 1989), we can compare changes in policy restrictiveness across time and across countries. Figure 4 illustrates aggregates of country-specific policy changes over three decades per policy area (Figures 4a-d) and aggregated across all four policy areas (Figure 4e).

Figure 4 illustrates area-specific levels of policy restrictiveness; with the red (blue) colouring representing more (less) restrictive policy levels at the beginning of 2020 than in our reference year 1989 in the respective European country. Regarding border policies, policy changes towards more restrictive regulations has been the dominant trend in all 31 European countries with more than 500 changes towards greater restrictiveness versus less than 50 changes towards more liberal regulations (Table 1). At the forefront of this trend has been the United Kingdom and Slovenia, but also the Benelux countries. France, Spain, or Italy have seen much tighter border policies in 2020 than 30 years before. At the lower end of this scale is Sweden, Switzerland or Cyprus which have only modestly tightened their border policies.

Policy changes in the area of admission take place most frequently; more than 60 per cent of all policy changes address this specific migration policy domain. Interestingly, there is not a clear Europe-wide trend in this area. While countries like Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, or Spain have significantly liberalised admission policies, the Netherlands and Denmark have tightened their admission and stay regulations over the past three decades.

Similar heterogeneity across European countries can be observed in the area of integration, where countries like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France have turned policies more restrictive while countries like Finland, Poland or the Southern European countries Portugal, Spain and Greece have implemented a range of policies that support the integration of their immigrant population.

Overall, the number of supportive integration policy measures is almost double (586) compared to the number of measures towards more restrictiveness (248) (Table 1). Return policy is the area with the least activity in terms of policy changes (491, i.e., less than 10 per cent of all policy changes fall into this area), with almost four out of five policy changes in this area have turned out to be more restrictive than the prior status quo regulation. For instance, Germany, Belgium, Hungary or Norway have implemented stricter policies on return including return enforcement or detention.

Across all four internal migration policy areas, and across the 31 European countries, the policy trends are rather mixed. While internal migration policies in the UK, the Netherlands or Slovenia have turned largely restrictive, countries like Luxembourg, Portugal or even Poland have seen a trend in the opposite direction (Figure 4e). The diversity in policy outcomes evolved across countries, but also across policy areas and over time.

Figure 4 Internal migration policy development in restrictiveness, 1990-2020

[a] Border policy



[b] Admission policy



[c] Integration policy



[d] Return policy



[4e] All internal migration policy



Data source: DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy database (2021). Own elaboration.

Figure 5 further identifies the Europe-wide policy dynamic over the past three decades on the four internal migration policy areas under scrutiny: while the restrictiveness of border policies is disproportionally intensifying over time, the growing restrictiveness of return policies follows a rather linear trend for the 31 European countries. However, while admission policies have been continuously liberalising at a growing pace across Europe, the frequency and magnitude by which integration-enhancing policies are implemented has been rather slowing down (Figure 5).

This bird's eye perspective of European migration policy trends can be further nuanced by state-specific disaggregation. Figure 6 illustrates that policy trends across the four internal policy areas followed dissimilar trends across Europe. While area-specific policies have diverged in several countries (e.g., Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia), some other countries have designed and implemented their internal migration policies much more coherently either in a rather restrictive (e.g., United Kingdom) or a more liberal direction (e.g., Sweden).

The Europe-wide trend of increasingly restrictive policies around border control and enforcement as well as on return (Figure 5) is mostly consistent but not for all 31 countries. For instance, Denmark has turned admission policies more restrictive and weakly liberalised return policies (both against the larger trend). Or, against the trend, the UK has been turning more restrictive in the area of migrant integration but did not significantly adjust their return policies. Interestingly, the island states of Iceland, Malta and Cyprus have kept their internal migration policies relatively neutral by mostly balancing out policy changes towards more restrictive regulations by changes in the opposite direction.

Figure 5 European trend in the level of restrictiveness of internal migration policies, by policy area



Data source: DEMIG-Quantmig migration policy database (2021). Own elaboration.

Figure 6: Level of restrictiveness of internal migration policies, by country and policy area



Data source: DEMIG-Quantmig migration policy database (2021). Own elaboration.

The extent to which internal migration policies are mutually interlinked in the frequency, direction, and magnitude of their evolution over three decades can be assessed by calculating Pearson cross-correlation coefficients (Table 2). We find the strongest correlation (0.547) between aggregated policy changes on admission and integration, with both areas strongly moving towards more liberal and migrant-friendly measures and regulations. Co-evolution towards more restrictive regulations around border control and return can be measured by a correlation coefficient of 0.394. For all the remaining dyadic policy area combinations we find negative correlations, meaning that trends in these policy dyads are significantly dissimilar, even though the conceptually more 'distant' policies of border enforcement and integration are only weakly correlated.

Table 2 Cross-correlation matrix of internal migration policies

	Border policy	Admission policy	Integration policy
Admission policy	-0.322*		
Integration policy	-0.164*	0.547*	
Return policy	0.394*	-0.390*	-0.310*

Note: (*) significant at 5% level.

These associations between different internal migration policy areas and instruments are more rigorously assessed in section 4. Before, we introduce and discuss trends of several key migration policies usually assigned to the external (i.e., ex-territorial) dimension which, in combination, form inherent elements of more complex policy configurations as conceptualised in section 2.

3.2 External policies

European governments increasingly complement their migration policy mixes by instruments addressing the external dimension of migration including travel visa, mechanisms and agreements regulating the return and readmission of migrants unlawfully residing in the country, or resettling refugees and people in need of protection from non-European third countries. In addition, we consider some other selected external policies such as development aid as migration-relevant, i.e., policymakers regularly justify and employ these policies for purposes of influencing international migration processes in a certain direction (usually to prevent emigration and large-scale movements or to facilitate repatriation).

The 'first line of defence' (as coined by Torpey 1998) in controlling migration are visa restrictions. Countries which are not part of the Schengen agreement, can individually chose which nationalities require a valid travel visa to enter the country. Member states of the Schengen area, instead, concede on a list of nationalities which require a temporary (Schengen) visa for entering the Schengen area and the respective country. Between 1995 and 2008 the Schengen area grew from 7 to now 26 member states. Overall, 30 out of 31 European (Schengen and non-Schengen) countries that form part of this study have significantly liberalised their visa policy – except for the United Kingdom whose visa policy has not liberalised in the past three decades (Figure A-1 in the Annex).

Over the past 30 years, European states have engaged in bilateral or multilateral (i.e., negotiated by the EU/EC) readmission agreements. These are signed with several dozens of non-European countries of origin or transit from where larger number of undocumented migrants originate. Enforcement of returning irregularly residing migrants back to their home countries (or countries of transit) is usually facilitated by these agreements as respective countries commit to their obligation to readmit migrants who European states wish to return. Even though readmission agreements in some legal forms have been used by all 31 European states of this study, the cross-country difference is in the overall extent and pace by which such agreements have been signed. While Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, or Finland can still refer to relatively few agreements, Switzerland or France are at the forefront by having signed around 60 readmission agreements (Figure A-2).

Another policy instrument implemented externally are resettlements. This policy is often mentioned but only very selectively used as an alternative pathway for refugees and asylum seekers to find protection on European territory. However, it is only a few (Western and Northern) European countries that resettle refugees frequently. While Norway and Sweden have regularly resettled protection seekers over the past two decades, Germany or the United Kingdom resettle only occasionally, and only rather recently (Figure A-3). Overall, resettlement of third country nationals into Europe is a policy area that is not a "preferred" option of policy makers for admitting migrants.

A policy instrument which is frequently highlighted as a tool for addressing the so-called 'root causes' of irregular migration into Europe is development aid. While this is not uncontroversial in the literature (Lanati and Thiele 2018; De Haas 2007), donor countries consider aid as instrumental for reducing irregular migration, through its impact on the livelihoods in the partner countries which are often countries of origin of irregular migrants. The so-called Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the European Union (EC) and its national member states amounted to more than €75.2 billion in 2019, which represents more than half of the global amount of ODA. However, not all European states are established aid donors. Most Eastern European states do not (yet) engage to a larger extent in the disbursement of development aid in non-European partner countries. On the other hand, Western and Northern European countries are among the world leading donor countries in terms of aid relative to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure A-4).

3.3 The European mix of internal and external migration policies

European governments are active in multiple internal and external migration policy areas, however often with quite different objectives, timings and configurational priorities of these policies. In order to compare the development of heterogenous policies across countries, we standardise all our policy indicators into z distributed variables with mean zero and standard deviation of one. This procedure allows a direct comparison of respective policy scores of otherwise heterogeneously measured policy data.

We first explore trends in policy area for stationarity by testing each of our key policy variables against a null hypothesis of unit roots. Table 3 indicates that for most policy areas this hypothesis can be rejected, yet not for all. Integration, return, and readmission policies are policy areas where policy trends are non-stationary over time, i.e., moments such as mean or variance are not stable over time.

After transforming all our policy variables into z distributions, Figure 7 displays polynomial best fits of z scores for eight migration-relevant policy areas with black-(red-)coloured lines representing internal (external) policy areas. Pooled on a European level, the graphs show a diversity of linear and non-linear policy trends. While the trend lines for the internal policies mirror those shown in Figure 5, a comparison with the trend patterns of external policies is only possible through this standardisation.

Table 3 Unit root test for stationarity

Policy area	Test statistic (adj. t)	P-value	Stationary
Border policy	–1.818*	0.0345	yes
Admission policy	–2.808**	0.0025	yes
Integration policy	–0.245	0.4033	no
Return policy	–0.099	0.4608	no
Visa policy	–30.623**	0.0000	yes
Readmission policy	-0.492	0.3114	no
Resettlement policy	-5.325**	0.0000	yes
Aid policy	-5.609**	0.0000	yes
Peacekeeping policy	-2.531*	0.0057	yes

Note: Levin-Lin-Chu test includes panel means and time trends. * (**) significant at 5 % (1%) level.

While a comparison of border and visa policies seem to illustrate policy evolution in opposite directions, this in fact reflects a larger shift in migration policy priorities. Border enforcement policies have become incrementally more restrictive, this has – with some time lag – been accompanied by a relaxation of visa restrictions for an increasing number of nationalities. The reversal in visa policy restrictiveness since the mid-2000s towards more liberal arrangements for inbound travel is in accordance with the steady trend towards lower barriers in admission and stay regulations. While access and admission have been relaxed, both return and readmission policies have followed

remarkably similar trends towards the goal of accelerating the voluntary, or if necessary, forced return of irregular residing migrants back to their home countries. Furthermore, liberalised admission and stay regulations for migrants who lawfully entered and reside the country has been actively supported by an intensification of integration efforts, even though with a diminishing policy dynamic. Finally, resettlement and aid policies have not seen any major trend over the past decades with moderately increasing efforts on resettlements but also stagnating aid disbursements, at least relative to the gross domestic product of the 31 European countries under observation.

Measuring cross-linkages between these policy areas shows a strong bivariate correlation of intensifying efforts for signing readmission agreements with countries of origin with attempts for border enforcement (0.516) as well as with efforts to enhance return (0.495). Interestingly, while readmission and border policies are strongly associated, visa policies are much stronger associated with border than with readmission policies (Table 4). Strong correlation exists between admission and both readmission policies and return policies. Weak correlation can be identified between aid policy and most other migration-relevant policies.

Figure 7 Co-evolution of European internal and external migration policies



Table 4 Cross-correlation matrix between internal and external migration-relevant policies

	Border policy	Admission policy	Integration policy	Return policy	Visa policy	Readmission policy	Resettlement policy
Admission policy	–0.322*						
Integration policy	–0.164*	0.547*					
Return policy	0.3910*	–0.390*	–0.310*				
Visa policy	**–0.343***	**0.214***	**0.055**	**–0.099***			
Readmission policy	**0.516***	**–0.439***	**–0.137***	**0.495***	–0.145*		
Resettlement policy	**0.286***	**–0.100***	**0.110***	**0.077**	–0.259*	0.201*	
Aid policy	**–0.049**	**0.271***	**0.207***	**–0.041**	–0.093	0.086	0.453*

Note: (*) significant at 5% level.

In sum, the visualization and statistical description demonstrate that the long-term development of multiple internal migration policies within countries is partly following a converging trend, e.g., policies on border and return enforcement or on admission and integration, while trends between these policy areas are rather diverging regarding their level of restrictiveness. However, not only internal migration policies seem to be incoherently associated, but also other internal and external migration-relevant policies appear to move even in opposite direction.

Yet, descriptive analysis is only an indication of the broader phenomenon. In the next section, we will further disentangle these correlations with the aim of identifying some more specific spatial (policy diffusion), intertemporal (policy timing) and configurational (between policy areas) patterns by applying more rigorous empirical techniques. We are therefore investigating how exactly internal and external migration-relevant policies are interlinked both within and across European destination countries.

4. Spatial, categorical, and temporal interlinkages of migration-relevant policies

4.1 Empirical strategy

In the following, we estimate the direction and intensity of categorical and spatial dependence between internal and external migration-relevant policies as hypothesised in section 2. Formally, we estimate panel fixed effects models of the following specification:

$$P_{jt}^{a} = \beta_0 + \beta_1^{s \neq a} P_{jt}^{s \neq a} + \beta_2 \omega_{jmt} \sum_{m \neq j} P_{mt}^{a} + \beta_3 X_{jt} + \rho_{jt}^{a} + \varepsilon_{jt}^{a}, \quad (1)$$

where P_{jt}^{a} is the z-score of the standardised migration policy indicator of a given type $a \in \{\text{border, admission, integration, return, visa, readmission, resettlement, aid}\}$ in the European policy-implementing destination country j in time period t; $P_{jt}^{s \neq a}$ is the z-sore of the other standardised migration policy indicators $s \neq a$ implemented in EU destination country j in time period t; $\omega_{jmt} \sum_{m \neq j} P_{imt}^{a}$ the spatially lagged policy dependence term capturing the (distance-) weighted policy composite of the other European destinations regarding migration policy of type a; and ε_{jt}^{a} is the idiosyncratic error term in the model of migration policy indicator a. To control for unobserved heterogeneity and spatial clustering, we include destination-time fixed effects ρ_{jt}^{a}. We further control for some time-variant policy-shaping factors X_{jt}.

To test spatial policy dependence across the 31 European policy-implementing destination countries, we first created spatial lag variables for each policy indicator. We employ the inverted distance between the European destination countries as our weight measure assuming that migration policies are geographically linked and possibly clustered. The population-weighted bilateral distance (defined as geographical distance between most populated cities) comes from the CEPII GeoDist dataset (Mayer and Zignago 2011). This procedure follows the method from Neumayer and Plümper (2010) who have used inverted distance as one of their spatial weight variables.

Our key dependent variables are the four internal migration policy areas border (and land control), admission (including legal entry and stay), integration, and return, in addition to a composite of the four. We run model (1) separately for each dependent variable to identify the relative importance of the other policy areas. The data on internal policies comes from the DEMIG-QuantMig migration policy dataset (2021) and covers all EU member states plus the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland for the period 1990–2020, as described above. The unit of analysis is the country-year.

The raw policy data identifies weighted policy changes by internal migration policy area, which means that the direction of annual policy changes towards more (–1) or less (+1) restrictiveness is weighted by the magnitudes of change (1–4). To estimate absolute levels of policy restrictiveness, we have further aggregated the yearly policy changes over time, using 1989 as the baseline. This transformation of the original policy data allows the comparison of absolute level of restrictiveness across policy area and across countries.

However, since the other external policy indicators originate from diverse sources, and therefore, follow different measurements, we have standardised all (internal and external) policy indicators to z-scores. Thus, all standardised policy indicators follow a z-distribution with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.

As explanatory variables we include all other internal migration policies to identify categorical

interlinkages between different internal migration policy areas. Moreover, we include other migration-relevant policies, such as on unemployment and education, to analyse their association with the four internal migration policy areas. We assume that these also contribute to, even if unintentionally or indirectly, trends in complex migration policy configurations towards more restrictiveness or liberalisation.[3]

Data for controlling on other internal migration-relevant policies are drawn from the *Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS)* (Armingeon, Engler, and Leeman 2021). Specifically, we use the variable for proxying on unemployment policy (unemployment benefits) measured as "cash expenditure for unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP". We further include a policy indicator on housing which measures total public and mandatory private expenditure on housing as a percentage of GDP (housing expenditures), and a policy indicator measuring general government expenditures on education (education expenditures) (Armingeon, Engler, and Leeman 2021). As data for all these variables is only available until 2018, we extrapolated for 2019–2020. Yet, no data is available for the EFTA countries and the sample is thus reduced.

Besides internal migration-relevant policies, we, moreover, incorporate external migration-relevant policy indicators to identify the interlinkages within external as well between internal and external migration-relevant policies. Therefore, we use data on three external migration policies: information on *visa* restrictions from the extended and extrapolated DEMIG Visa database (2021), the yearly number of *resettlements* from UNHCR (UNHCR Resettlement Data, 2021), and number of signed and active *readmission* agreements from Cassarino´s inventory of bilateral agreements[4]. The visa policy indicator describes the percentage of countries for which each European country requires a short-term travel visa to access its territory.

Since development aid is often associated to the goal of addressing the 'root causes' of irregular migration, we included international aid as another external migration-relevant policy variable. We hereby multiplied the annual amount of Official Development Aid (ODA) allocated by each European country for the sectors "Humanitarian Aid" and "Social Infrastructures and Services" as a percentage of GDP of the European donor country, based on data available in the OECD/DAC database (2021). We further included the number of deployments for peacekeeping operations as percentage of a country's population. This information is derived from the IPI Peacekeeping Database[5].

As for the control variables, we include in all models, first, the non-EU immigrant stock as a percentage of the total number of immigrants in each EU country, and second, the number of asylum applications relative to the respective European country´s population, based on data extracted from UNHCR (2021). We also control for the economic situation in the European destinations by including both growth in real income and the unemployment rate, extracted from the World Bank[6].

---

[3] For a full typology on migration and migration-relevant policies, see: Czaika, Erdal and Talleras (2021).

[4] Inventory of the bilateral agreements linked to readmission – Jean-Pierre Cassarino (jeanpierrecassarino.com). Accessed 08.10.2021

We aggregated the agreements signed in the 30 years under consideration, assigning 1 point for every new standard agreement (formal bilateral readmission agreement) and 0,5 for non-standard ones (e.g., mobility partnership, memorandum of understanding, common operating procedures). Agreements replacing existing ones have been counted as 0. Since data were available until 2019, we extrapolated to cover values for 2020.

[5] IPI Peacekeeping Database - Humanitarian Data Exchange (humdata.org). Accessed on 08.10.2021

[6] As 1990 is missing from the data on unemployment, we extrapolate here as well. See: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG.

4.2 Results and Discussion

The following panel regression results are based on the fixed effects model (1) and provide estimates addressing the four basic hypotheses as outlined in section 2. We first discuss the extent to which internal migration policies are categorically interlinked with other internal migration policies.

4.2.1. Interlinkages between internal migration policies

Table 5 reports point estimates on z-transformed policy and control variables. The four migration policy areas border, admission, integration, and return are hereby statistically significantly interconnected, supporting the fundamental hypothesis about the interconnected nature of migration policy configurations. However, even though policy areas are mutually interlinked, the direction of the interaction is specific to a policy dyad (pair). That is, the four internal migration policy areas do not evolve in the same direction (as the previous section suggested).

Table 5 Interlinkages between internal migration policies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DV: Policy area	Border	Admission	Integration	Return
Border		–0.336***	–0.0468*	0.247***
		(0.0238)	(0.0263)	(0.0283)
Admission	–0.528***		0.440***	–0.291***
	(0.0374)		(0.0297)	(0.0357)
Integration	–0.0729*	0.437***		–0.117***
	(0.0410)	(0.0295)		(0.0366)
Return	0.308***	–0.231***	–0.0941***	
	(0.0354)	(0.0283)	(0.0293)	
Migrant stock	0.0731	–0.0717	–0.180***	–0.277***
	(0.0650)	(0.0518)	(0.0518)	(0.0575)
GDP per capita	–0.00682	–0.0189	0.0148	0.00384
	(0.0183)	(0.0146)	(0.0147)	(0.0164)
Unemployment rate	–0.0462*	0.0423**	–0.0698***	–0.0240
	(0.0264)	(0.0210)	(0.0210)	(0.0236)
Asylum applications	0.0105	–0.0201	–0.111***	–0.00805
	(0.0236)	(0.0188)	(0.0185)	(0.0211)
Constant	0.00157	–0.00139	–0.00152	–0.00245
	(0.0183)	(0.0146)	(0.0147)	(0.0164)
Observations	961	961	961	961
R-squared	0.505	0.623	0.468	0.417
Countries	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

For instance, admission policies are negatively associated with border policies, but also with return policies. More concretely, liberalization of admission policies by one standard deviation is usually associated with more restrictive border policies of 0.528 standard deviations, but only a 0.291 standard deviation change in restrictive policies on return. The negative associations between border policies and admission as well as integration policies is indicative of the 'fortress Europe' idea of secured borders, on the one hand, and internal liberalization of admission and integration policies on the other. This also supports our hypothesis 1 that is based on the "number versus rights" logic. That is, while governments turn border policies more restrictive with the intention to reduce the number of (irregular) migrants, they might provide more rights internally by liberalising integration policies. This, at least, suggests the negative association between border and integration, as well as admission.

The (negative) link between admission and border policies is the strongest in this 4x3 matrix of internal migration policy areas. This is not by surprise as they are both concerned with redirecting the irregular 'entry' of migrants towards more regular pathways. The weakest link between internal migration policy areas exists between border and integration policies providing an indication for the assumption that more 'distant' policy areas – regarding their ultimate objectives – are rather loosely linked.

At the same time, admission policies are positively associated with integration policies, that is the trend towards more liberal entry regulations has been supplemented by supportive integration measures. A similar positive relationship exists between border and return policies, even though these two policies co-evolve towards more restrictive policy regulations. A one standard deviation change towards more restrictive border policies is usually associated with a 0.247 standard deviation change towards more restrictive return policies, or a 0.308 standard deviation change vice versa, indicating to some policy coherence between these two policy areas.

Interestingly, a higher percentage in the non-European immigrant population is only relevant for policies on integration and return, but not for border or admission policies. That is, a larger non-European population is usually associated with more restrictive integration and return policies. The relative importance of asylum application is similarly associated with a more restrictive integration policy, but not with any of the other internal migration policies. This finding might seem surprising considering the anti-sympathetic sentiments towards refugees in many parts of Europe in recent years. The unemployment rate is (negative) significant for almost all internal migration policies except return, yet positively significant in relation to admission policies. Income growth seems not to play a role for internal migration policymaking.

In addition, we also tested for temporal dependence between different migration policy areas (see Table A-2 in the Annex). The results show that in most cases, temporal dependence does play some role. Overall, migration policies seem to change rather simultaneously instead of being sequential lagged. This can be seen by the non-significant results of the temporal lags (1 and 2 years), but significant results of when there is no lag. This might be an indication that specific migration policies are often part of a broader migration reform package that take place at the same time. Only in the case of admission, a time lag of two years is for all policy areas significant.

Regarding other migration-relevant internal policies, i.e., those where migrants may only be indirectly affected, the results reported in Table 6 only partly confirm the welfare magnet argument and thus, hypothesis 2. For example, as housing expenditure increases, the more restrictive become border, admission and return policies. The strongest link is between housing and border. Education expenditure is also overall positively associated with migration policies overall on the aggregate level as well with admission.

Yet, against expectation, education and unemployment expenditures are negatively associated with border. Unemployment benefits are, in addition, negatively connected to admission. These policy configurations thus rather co-evolve in the same than into opposite directions as would be hypothesized by the welfare magnet argument. The reason could be that those countries that are more generous providers of welfare benefits, e.g., for unemployment or education, are usually also more welcoming to migrants. In the past, this has for example been the case for the Northern European countries, such as Sweden (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012). Their generous welfare system might function as a 'buffer' for more restrictions. However, the findings demonstrate as well that the higher the unemployment rate, the more restrictive migration policies become on border enforcement and admission. Thus, the results do not provide a clear picture. A problem might be also that the operationalisation of migration-relevant policies in terms of education and unemployment benefits relative to the GDP are overly crude measures. Possibly more specific and

disaggregated policy measures are needed to get a better understanding of the interlinkages between internal migration and migration-relevant policies

Table 6 Interlinkages between internal migration and other migration-relevant policies

DV: Policy area	(1) All internal policies	(2) Border	(3) Admission	(4) Integration	(5) Return
Border			-0.357***	-0.0150	0.189***
			(0.0255)	(0.0298)	(0.0312)
Admission		-0.535***		0.463***	-0.264***
		(0.0382)		(0.0328)	(0.0380)
Integration		-0.0203	0.419***		-0.153***
		(0.0404)	(0.0296)		(0.0368)
Return		0.224***	-0.208***	-0.134***	
		(0.0370)	(0.0300)	(0.0321)	
Unemployment	-0.0773**	-0.265***	-0.193***	0.0563*	0.0186
benefits	(0.0343)	(0.0338)	(0.0278)	(0.0300)	(0.0322)
Education expend.	0.221***	-0.200***	0.0904***	0.0160	-0.0565*
	(0.0286)	(0.0311)	(0.0258)	(0.0273)	(0.0292)
Housing expend.	0.0463	0.245***	0.116***	0.00577	0.0930**
	(0.0452)	(0.0445)	(0.0368)	(0.0389)	(0.0415)
Migrant stock	-0.101	0.00267	-0.0757	-0.174***	-0.288***
	(0.0633)	(0.0632)	(0.0515)	(0.0539)	(0.0572)
GDP per capita	0.0279	-0.0520***	-0.0166	0.0275*	0.00962
	(0.0187)	(0.0183)	(0.0150)	(0.0158)	(0.0169)
Unemployment rate	0.00999	0.0593**	0.0893***	-0.0960***	-0.0303
	(0.0278)	(0.0275)	(0.0223)	(0.0234)	(0.0253)
Asylum applicat.	-0.146***	0.0121	-0.0229	-0.108***	-0.0138
	(0.0233)	(0.0237)	(0.0193)	(0.0200)	(0.0217)
Constant	0.0173	0.0332*	0.0298*	-0.0274*	0.00662
	(0.0195)	(0.0191)	(0.0156)	(0.0164)	(0.0176)
Observations	868	868	868	868	868
R-squared	0.124	0.579	0.659	0.493	0.418
Countries	28	28	28	28	28

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Overall, the results nevertheless demonstrate that internal migration and migration-relevant policies, such as housing, unemployment, and education, can be relevant and associated to other internal migration policy domains, yet to different degrees. Particularly border enforcement policies seem to play the strongest role as the coefficients are the highest within these policy configurations. Integration yet relates to other migration-relevant policy areas to a lesser degree. The reason could be that the benefits of expenditures already reflect partly the integration measures. Therefore, migration policies should be regarded within a broader policy configuration and not just be studied individually to understand, for example, the effects of policy restrictions on integration.

4.2.2. Interlinkages between internal and external migration policies

Expanding on the toolbox of migration-relevant policies, Table 7 reports on estimates on the interlinkages between internal migration-relevant policies and external migration policies. First, we clearly can see that external migration policies are strongly associated with internal migration policies, both at an aggregate and disaggregated level. For all internal policy areas, external policies are of significant relevance as shown by the significant coefficients in all model specifications. Yet, how exactly do internal and external policies interact? From the "internal-external security nexus" argument or "escape logic" as stated, e.g., by Carrapico and Trauner (2012) and in section 2, we would expect that increased restrictiveness of the external policy mix is associated with increased liberalisation of the internal policy mix. This, however, can only been partly confirmed. Hypothesis 3, thus, cannot be verified for all policy configurations.

Table 7 Interlinkages between internal and external migration policies

DV: Policy area	(1) All internal policies	(2) All internal policies	(3) Border	(4) Admission	(5) Integration	(6) Return
Border				–0.104***	–0.108***	0.0721**
				(0.0241)	(0.0271)	(0.0303)
Admission			–0.191***		0.555***	–0.102**
			(0.0443)		(0.0323)	(0.0411)
Integration			–0.157***	0.439***		–0.162***
			(0.0395)	(0.0255)		(0.0363)
Return			0.0849**	–0.0655**	–0.131***	
			(0.0357)	(0.0263)	(0.0294)	
Readmission	–0.216***	–0.177***	0.299***	–0.291***	0.135***	0.374***
	(0.0247)	(0.0265)	(0.0352)	(0.0252)	(0.0300)	(0.0313)
Visa	0.155***	0.177***	–0.141***	0.224***	–0.0931***	0.0578**
	(0.0238)	(0.0243)	(0.0270)	(0.0188)	(0.0225)	(0.0252)
Resettlement	0.0789***	0.0843***	0.176***	–0.0486***	0.160***	0.0817***
	(0.0222)	(0.0223)	(0.0234)	(0.0177)	(0.0193)	(0.0221)
Peacekeeping		0.0438**	–0.127***	–0.0470***	0.0794***	–0.0122
		(0.0221)	(0.0227)	(0.0169)	(0.0189)	(0.0212)
Aid		–0.130***	0.0841*	0.0622*	–0.166***	0.0397
		(0.0481)	(0.0492)	(0.0363)	(0.0405)	(0.0454)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.00443	-0.0113	0.0195	-0.00685	-0.00201	0.0116
	(0.0163)	(0.0164)	(0.0166)	(0.0122)	(0.0137)	(0.0153)
Observations	961	961	961	961	961	961
R-squared	0.247	0.259	0.611	0.746	0.551	0.514
Countries	31	31	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Visa policy restrictions come with more relaxed border enforcement policies and more supportive integration policies, and at the same time, seem to be combined with stricter admission and return policies. This policy configuration gets more complex when also resettlement policies are considered. While more restrictive (liberal) visa policies seem to be combined with overall more (less) restrictive internal migration policies (e.g., on admission), this policy complex is partly

counterbalanced by more generous (restrictive) resettlement policies. These policy configurations therefore move into opposite directions. The strongest link here is between readmission and admission policies.

Consequently, external migration policies generally should not be ignored in the broader configuration of migration-relevant policies. Only the direction of interaction is inconclusive and requires further investigation. For instance, while an increasing focus on readmission is largely associated with an intensification of border and return enforcement policies, it is also in line with more restrictive integration policies, as well as more liberal admission policies. Here our hypothesis thus does not hold. Moreover, of all external policy areas in our sample, resettlement generally is the least connected to all other internal migration policies, largely because overall few resettlement quotas are available and only few countries resettle at all.

When moving beyond internal and external migration policies to external migration relevant policies, we find that not all interlinkages between internal and external migration-relevant policy follow consistently the same trend. For example, enhanced aid disbursement is combined with stricter border and return policies, military interventions in the form of peacekeeping missions are rather linked to changes towards more liberal arrangements in these policy areas, although not statistically significant for return. In general, greater financial or technical engagement of European donor countries in form of development assistance is 'traded' against military interventions, as both policy areas show consistently the opposite linkages with respective internal migration policy areas.

Aid seems to increase the restrictiveness of border and admission, but only loosely. The link is stronger for aid and integration and migration policies overall on the aggregate level where it is also negative. This latter finding supports the idea of using aid as a migration control tool to counterbalance liberalisation of internal migration policy, such as integration. Therefore, the internal-external policy configuration is not consistent throughout, seen by the example of aid, peacekeeping, visa, or readmission associations with internal migration policy areas, as these policy areas may not (always) follow the same goals. This leads to the conclusion that there is considerable policy incoherence between internal and external migration policies exist. Yet it is further demonstrated that internal and external migration policies are categorically intertwined.

4.2.3. Spatial interlinkages between migration-relevant policies

We further hypothesized that internal and external migration policies are not only categorically interlinked, but also spatially. Table 8 shows the results of spatial cross-European interlinkages of internal migration policies, while Table 9 shows respective spatial dependences of external policies. For both policy domains, we find spatial dependence between geographically proximate European countries, indicated by the positive and significant coefficients for all spatial lag terms. We therefore find supportive evidence for hypothesis 4; migration policies changes, be it internal or external, follow similar trends in other European countries and may even converge over time across Europe (Hollifield et al. 2014; Meyers 2002).

Table 8 Spatial interlinkages of internal migration policies

DV: Policy area	(1) All internal policies	(2) Border	(3) Admission	(4) Integration	(5) Return
Spatial effect	0.314***	0.658***	0.437***	0.0948***	0.217***
	(0.0167)	(0.0224)	(0.0253)	(0.0282)	(0.0333)
Admission		0.0287		0.391***	–0.200***
		(0.0329)		(0.0330)	(0.0376)
Integration		–0.0283	0.287***		–0.0609*
		(0.0296)	(0.0270)		(0.0368)
Return		0.0979***	–0.125***	–0.0642**	
		(0.0264)	(0.0254)	(0.0305)	
Border			0.000966	–0.00482	0.118***
			(0.0285)	(0.0290)	(0.0340)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	–0.00129	0.00159	–0.00174	–0.00149	–0.00239
	(0.0154)	(0.0132)	(0.0127)	(0.0146)	(0.0160)
Observations	961	961	961	961	961
R-squared	0.318	0.744	0.715	0.474	0.442
Countries	31	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Changes in policy-mixes in one EU country follow hereby changes in other geographically proximate countries. The strongest spatial interlinkage we identify in the areas of border policy (Table 7) and readmission policy (Table 8). This implies that more restrictive border policies in geographically proximate countries produce a policy spillover effect in neighboring countries. This is less the case in the area of admission and visa policy, and the least in the area of integration policy. This suggests that integration policies are largely independent from integration policy changes in other European countries, which we interpret as an indication for the fact that policy makers consider integration as a prime national policy domain with relatively little implications or externalities for the rest of Europe.

In the domain of external migration policies[7] though, policy convergence seems to be the dominant pattern, which is supported by the policy diffusion literature (e.g., Gilard and Wasserfallen 2019). Policy harmonization at the European level, coordinated by the European Commission, leads in some external policy areas such as on visa or readmission, to an institutionalized policy diffusion with relatively little leeway for national specificities. We find evidence for weak spatial dependence in the area of resettlement, an area where only very few European countries are active on a large scale, and with little coordinative capacity of European institutions.

Finally, how are external migration-relevant policies interlinked? Table 8 further reports that visa policies become more restrictive with increasing aid allocations. Aid in this way is complementarily used to strengthen migration control (Thiele and Lanati 2018). At the same time, increasing aid allocations seem to support efforts on resettlement and readmission. Aid policies have hereby the strongest link with resettlement, possibly counterbalancing the reluctantly provided resettlement options by some 'compensatory' aid. In the case of peacekeeping deployments, we find evidence for this policy area to be complementary to efforts on resettlement and readmission, but also with regard to the more relaxed visa regulations. Therefore, we find empirical support for both, counter-

[7] In the Annex, we did the same with the aggregate of all internal migration policies.

balancing effects between migration and external migration-relevant policies, but also for co-evolving trends of external migration policies.

In sum, we can conclude that strong categorical and spatial interlinkages between both internal and external migration-relevant policies exists, although to different degrees and strengths.[8] Moreover, the extent to which these functional relationships are by design or rather 'unintentional' is beyond the scope of this paper.

However, most of the hypotheses outlined in section 2 are largely supported by the above findings, indicating that a complex policy making dynamic may exist, and therefore, broader migration policy configurations should not be ignored, neither in designing effective migration policies nor in analysing migration policy effects. Our results seem to indicate that policies can partly undermine the expected effects of other policies, thus demanding for an enhanced policy coordination within and across European countries.

Table 9 Spatial and categorical interlinkages of external migration policies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DV: Policy area	Readmission	Visa	Resettlement	Readmission	Visa	Resettlement
Spatial effect				0.656***	0.436***	0.193***
				(0.0235)	(0.0358)	(0.0336)
Readmission		–0.182***	–0.00513		–0.0920**	0.00310
		(0.0437)	(0.0500)		(0.0412)	(0.0492)
Visa	–0.102***		0.0893**	–0.0914***		0.108***
	(0.0245)		(0.0373)	(0.0180)		(0.0369)
Resettlement	–0.00223	0.0693**		0.00118	0.0976***	
	(0.0218)	(0.0290)		(0.0160)	(0.0270)	
Aid	0.199***	0.255***	0.298***	0.0544*	0.226***	0.259***
	(0.0440)	(0.0588)	(0.0667)	(0.0328)	(0.0546)	(0.0659)
Peacekeeping	–0.0488**	–0.117***	0.0870***	0.0479***	–0.168***	0.0861***
	(0.0207)	(0.0275)	(0.0314)	(0.0156)	(0.0259)	(0.0309)
Border	0.244***	–0.206***	0.330***	–0.0433*	0.000535	0.186***
	(0.0287)	(0.0392)	(0.0438)	(0.0235)	(0.0401)	(0.0498)
Admission	–0.437***	0.599***	–0.168***	–0.117***	0.349***	–0.122**
	(0.0378)	(0.0502)	(0.0610)	(0.0300)	(0.0509)	(0.0605)
Integration	0.160***	–0.197***	0.437***	0.269***	–0.190***	0.418***
	(0.0356)	(0.0475)	(0.0525)	(0.0264)	(0.0441)	(0.0517)
Return	0.359***	0.0989**	0.180***	0.220***	0.0334	0.193***
	(0.0301)	(0.0431)	(0.0487)	(0.0227)	(0.0403)	(0.0479)
Constant	–0.0104	0.0184	–0.0165	–0.0214*	0.0186	–0.0178
	(0.0150)	(0.0200)	(0.0227)	(0.0110)	(0.0185)	(0.0223)
Observations	961	961	961	961	961	961
R-squared	0.696	0.463	0.217	0.836	0.538	0.244
Countries	31	31	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls included.

[8] In the annex, we also tested for temporal dependence. Overall, policies change simultaneously instead of being sequential. This can be seen by the non-significant results of the temporal lags (1 and 2 years), but significant results of when there is no lag in Table A-2. Therefore, European governments need especially to be aware of the interlinkages and intended or unintended effects of migration and migration relevant policies and consider the interactions between both internal and external migration policy mix.

5. Conclusion

This study has shown that European policies with migration relevance are directly or indirectly interlinked and functionally intertwined, forming complex policy configurations. Drawing on a compilation of new and updated policy datasets on internal, external, and other migration-relevant policies, we explored those configurations in and across 31 European states between 1990 and 2020. The three decades under scrutiny have been characterized by intense policy activity, with European policymakers being increasingly engaged in policy reforms. This dynamism comes with no surprise, irrespective of whether we explain it by looking at the salience of migration in the public debate, at potential functional spillovers of the European integration process or at the number of external events occurred during this timeframe.

At the same time, the magnitude of the changes has gradually decreased, and adaptations have mostly fine-tuned the existing "policy core" (Trauner and Servent 2016). Taking this dynamic policy landscape as a starting point, our analysis demonstrates that, although to different degrees, functional relationships do exist among internal migration policies (on border enforcement, admission, integration, return), but also between internal and some external migration policies such as readmission and visa policies, as well as between migration and migration-relevant policies such as health, labour-markets, or aid. Policies and migration-relevant policies co-evolve within larger complexes towards more, or less, restrictiveness *within* but also *between* countries. We thus argue here that, rather than being unstructured and functionally unrelated sets of multiple instruments, policies do mutually affect (strengthen or undermine) each other, and conjointly diminish or enhance their effectiveness, depending on the direction of their co-evolution and the degree of functional interlinkage. From this perspective, we can fairly claim that the notion of policy configuration is a more appropriate concept to capture the evolution of migration and migration-relevant policies in Europe.

Highlighting the complex interplay between policy instruments, our research has fleshed out four fundamental hypotheses, the first applying the "numbers versus rights logic" among internal migration policies, the second applying the welfare-magnet proposition to migration and migration relevant policies, the third checking the validity of the 'internal-external security nexus' and the fourth elaborating on the convergence effect across policy mixes. The findings support by and large our hypotheses and draw at the same time an heterogenous picture, with multiple migration and migration-relevant policies showing different degrees of interconnectedness, and often evolving in opposite directions. We show, for instance, that internal migration policies are highly interlinked. Yet, the direction of policy changes illustrates that policy linkages are 'clustered'. While states seem to rely on border and return policies *together* to control the number of migrants entering and residing in Europe, they also tend to coordinate on the 'qualitative composition' of the migrant population through the co-development of their admission and integration policies.

When comparing internal and external policy domains, we see less coherent trends. These dimensions are, indeed, strongly associated, but the "internal-external security nexus," according to which internal liberalisation would trigger more restrictive external policies is not validated for all policy areas. The picture that emerges from the combination of these results indicates *inter alia* a 'fortress Europe' in the making wherein visa policy restrictions are utilised as a 'first line of defence' and a pre-condition for European governments to loosen border enforcement, expand on their opportunities for admission and strengthen their integration support policies. Moreover, only weakly increasing aid disbursements and only selectively relaxing internal and external policies suggest that aid may still play a rather subordinate role as tool for managing and controlling unwanted immigration. Besides aid, additional work is needed to understand and conjecture on the

complex relationship between migration and other migration-relevant such as welfare provisions.

While the strong spatial convergence towards restrictive border and intensifying efforts to facilitate return and readmission witnessed across European countries contribute to the narrative of a fortress in the making, cross-country interlinkages, and common trends in some policy areas like admission, visa and integration are weaker and do not hint at a homogeneously liberal internal dimension. A fine-grained explanation of the substantial independence of these policy domains is beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in a follow up to this research. However, it is worth highlighting how those areas, unlike return and readmission, pertain to the core of state sovereignty, they are loosely coordinated at the supranational level and involve overly complex agenda.

To further explain the complex patterns that we have identified in this paper, one cannot ignore the manifold array of actors, institutions and norms that drive or constrain policy regimes´ formation and change. Our findings therefore complement the rich literature on migration policy drivers (Boswell 2007; Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011; Geddes 2018) by disentangling European policy-mixes, describing functional relationships within and across mixes and validating the more fine-grained notion of configurations as a conceptual starting point for future research. Moreover, in line with what has been demonstrated by previous studies on the side effects of policy interventions on migrations flows (Czaika and de Haas 2013), this contribution suggests that policymakers must consider the impact that some instruments may have on policy-making processes in other realms and in proximate countries.

6. References

Allard, Scott W., and Sheldon Danziger. 2000. 'Welfare Magnets: Myth or Reality?' *The Journal of Politics* 62 (2): 350–68.

Armingeon, Klaus, Sarah Engler, and Lucas Leeman. 2021. *Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2019*. https://cpds-data.org/.

Balch, Alex, and Andrew Geddes. 2012. 'Connections between Admission and Integration Policies at EU-Level Abd given Linkages with National Policy Making'. *Prosint Project Deliverable WP1*. https://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project_material/PROSINT/Reports/WP1_CompRep_Final_Submitted.pdf.

Berthélemy, Jean-Claude, Monica Beuran, and Mathilde Maurel. 2009. 'Aid and Migration: Substitutes or Complements?' *World Development* 37 (10): 1589–99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.02.002.

Bialasiewicz, Luiza. 2012. 'Off-Shoring and Out-Sourcing the Borders of EUrope: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean'. *Geopolitics* 17 (4): 843–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2012.660579.

Bigo, Didier. 2014. 'The (in)Securitization Practices of the Three Universes of EU Border Control: Military/Navy – Border Guards/Police – Database Analysts'. *Security Dialogue* 45 (3): 209–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614530459.

Borjas, George J. 1999. 'Immigration and Welfare Magnets'. *Journal of Labor Economics* 17 (4): 607–37. https://doi.org/10.1086/209933.

Boswell, Christina. 2007. 'Theorizing Migration Policy: Is There a Third Way?' *International Migration Review* 41 (1): 75–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00057.x.

Boucher, Anna, and Justin Gest. 2015. 'Migration Studies at a Crossroads: A Critique of Immigration Regime Typologies'. *Migration Studies* 3 (2): 182–98. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnu035.

Brochmann, Grete, and Anniken Hagelund. 2012. *Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian Welfare State 1945-2010*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Cassarino, Jean-Pierre. 2010. *Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*. Washington: Middle East Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/14454.

Castles, Stephen. 2004. 'The Factors That Make and Unmake Migration Policies'. *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 852–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00222.x.

Clark, Ken, Lindsey Garratt, Yaojun Li, Kitty Lymperopoulou, and William Shankley. 2019. 'Local Deprivation and the Labour Market Integration of New Migrants to England'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45 (17): 3260–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1481000.

Czaika, Mathias. 2020. 'National Migration Policy: Nature, Patterns, and Effects'. In *Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development*. Routledge.

Czaika, Mathias, Heidrun Bohnet, and Akira Soto-Nishimura. 2021. 'Spatial and Categorical Dependence of European Migration Flows'. *QuantMig Project Deliverable 5.2*. http://www.quantmig.eu/res/files/QuantMig%20D5.2%20v1.1Final.pdf.

Czaika, Mathias, and Hein De Haas. 2013. 'The Effectiveness of Immigration Policies'. *Population and Development Review* 39 (3): 487–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00613.x.

Czaika, Mathias, Marta Bivand Erdal, and Catherine Talleraas. 2021. 'Theorising the Interaction between Migration-Relevant Policies and Migration Driver Environments'. *QuantMig Project Deliverable 1.4*. http://www.quantmig.eu/res/files/QuantMig%20D1.4%20Policy-Driver%20Interactions%20V1.1%2030Sep2021DL.pdf.

De Haas, Hein. 2007. 'Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration'. *Development*

and Change 38 (5): 819–41. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2007.00435.x.

De Haas, Hein, and Mathias Czaika. 2015. 'Evaluating Migration Policy Effectiveness'. In *Routledge Handbook of Immigration and Refugee Studies*. London: Routledge.

Elsner, Benjamin, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. 2016. 'Migration 10 Years After: EU Enlargement, Closed Borders, and Migration to Germany'. In *Labor Migration, EU Enlargement, and the Great Recession*, edited by Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, 85–101. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45320-9_4.

Geddes, Andrew. 2018. 'The Politics of European Union Migration Governance'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 56 (S1): 120–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12763.

———. 2021. *Governing Migration Beyond the State: Europe, North America, South America, and Southeast Asia in a Global Context*. Oxford, UNITED KINGDOM: Oxford University Press USA - OSO. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/univie/detail.action?docID=6452157.

Geddes, Andrew, and Andrew Taylor. 2016. 'In the Shadow of Fortress Europe? Impacts of European Migration Governance on Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42 (4): 587–605. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1102041.

Genova, Nicholas De, and Nathalie Peutz, eds. 2010. *The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement*. Illustrated edition. Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books.

Gilardi, Fabrizio, and Fabio Wasserfallen. 2019. 'The Politics of Policy Diffusion'. *European Journal of Political Research* 58 (4): 1245–56. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12326.

Graae Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas. 2006. 'Outsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy'. Working Paper 2006:1. DIIS Working Paper. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/84606.

Graee Gammeltoft-Hansen, Tim. 2006. 'Outsourcing Migration Management: EU, Power, and Immigration Policy'. 1. DIIS Working Paper. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/84606.

Graham, Erin R., Charles R. Shipan, and Craig Volden. 2013. 'The Diffusion of Policy Diffusion Research in Political Science'. *British Journal of Political Science* 43 (3): 673–701. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123412000415.

Guiraudon, Virginie, and Gallya Lahav. 2000. 'A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control'. *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (2): 163–95. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414000033002001.

Haahr, Jens Henrik, and William Walters. 2004. *Governing Europe: Discourse, Governmentality and European Integration*. Routledge.

Haas, Hein de. 2008. 'The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Europe'. *Third World Quarterly* 29 (7): 1305–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802386435.

Haas, Hein de, Mathias Czaika, Marie-Laurence Flahaux, Edo Mahendra, Katharina Natter, Simona Vezzoli, and María Villares-Varela. 2019. 'International Migration: Trends, Determinants, and Policy Effects'. *Population and Development Review* 45 (4): 885–922. https://doi.org/10.1111/padr.12291.

Haas, Hein de, Katharina Natter, and Simona Vezzoli. 2015. 'Conceptualizing and Measuring Migration Policy Change'. *Comparative Migration Studies* 3 (1): 15. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-015-0016-5.

Haas, Hein de, and Simona Vezzoli. 2011. 'Leaving Matters: The Nature, Evolution and Effects of Emigration Policies'. *IMI Working Paper Series* 34 (April). https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/wp-34-11.

Hollifield, James F. 2004. 'The Emerging Migration State'. *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 885–912. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00223.x.

Horvath, Kenneth, Anna Amelina, and Karin Peters. 2017. 'Re-Thinking the Politics of Migration. On the Uses and Challenges of Regime Perspectives for Migration Research'. *Migration*

Studies 5 (3): 301–14. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnx055.

İçduygu, Ahmet, and Damla B. Aksel. 2014. 'Two-to-Tango in Migration Diplomacy: Negotiating Readmission Agreement between the Eu and Turkey'. *European Journal of Migration and Law* 16 (3): 337–63. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12342060.

Kasparek, Bernd. 2016. 'Complementing Schengen: The Dublin System and the European Border and Migration Regime'. In *Migration Policy and Practice: Interventions and Solutions*, edited by Harald Bauder and Christian Matheis, 59–78. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137503817_4.

Kuschminder, Katie, and Khalid Koser. 2017. 'The Role of Migration-Specific and Migration-Relevant Policies in Migrant Decision-Making in Transit'. 2017–022. *MERIT Working Papers*. MERIT Working Papers. United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT). https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/unumer/2017022.html.

Lanati, Mauro, and Rainer Thiele. 2018. 'The Impact of Foreign Aid on Migration Revisited'. *World Development* 111 (November): 59–74. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.06.021.

Lavenex, Sandra. 2006. 'Shifting up and out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control'. *West European Politics* 29 (2): 329–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500512684.

Lutz, Philipp. 2019. 'Variation in Policy Success: Radical Right Populism and Migration Policy'. *West European Politics* 42 (3): 517–44. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1504509.

Mayer, Thierry, and Soledad Zignago. 2011. 'Notes on CEPII's Distances Measures: The GeoDist Database'. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1994531. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1994531.

Parsons, Christopher R., and L. Alan Winters. 2014. 'International Migration, Trade and Aid: A Survey'. In *International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development*, edited by Robert Lucas, 65–112. online version: Edward Elgar Publishing. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781782548065/9781782548065.00008.xml.

Plümper, Thomas, and Eric Neumayer. 2010. 'Model Specification in the Analysis of Spatial Dependence'. *European Journal of Political Research* 49 (3): 418–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01900.x.

Razin, Assaf, and Jackline Wahba. 2015. 'Welfare Magnet Hypothesis, Fiscal Burden, and Immigration Skill Selectivity'. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 117 (2): 369–402. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12092.

Ruhs, Martin, and Philip Martin. 2008. 'Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-Offs and Guest Worker Programs1'. *International Migration Review* 42 (1): 249–65. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2007.00120.x.

Samers, Michael. 2016. 'New Guest Worker Regimes?' In *An Anthology of Migration and Social Transformation: European Perspectives*, edited by Anna Amelina, Kenneth Horvath, and Bruno Meeus, 121–34. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23666-7_8.

Sasse, Gwendolyn. 2005. 'Securitization or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Policies towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe*'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 43 (4): 673–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00591.x.

Scholten, Peter. 2020. 'Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Conceptualising the Role of Complexity in Migration and Diversity Policymaking'. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (1): 108–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1625758.

Scholten, Peter, and Rinus Penninx. 2016. 'The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration'. In *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe: Contexts, Levels and Actors*, edited by Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas and Rinus Penninx, 91–108. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_6.

Schultz, Caroline, Philipp Lutz, and Stephan Simon. 2021. 'Explaining the Immigration Policy Mix: Countries' Relative Openness to Asylum and Labour Migration'. *European Journal of Political Research* 60 (4): 763–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12422.

Sciortino, Giuseppe. 2004. 'Immigration in a Mediterranean Welfare State: The Italian Experience in Comparative Perspective'. *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 6 (2): 111–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/1387698042000273442.

Stutz, Philipp, and Florian Trauner. 2021. 'The EU's "Return Rate" with Third Countries: Why EU Readmission Agreements Do Not Make Much Difference'. *International Migration* n/a (n/a). https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12901.

Torpey, John. 1998. 'Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate "Means of Movement"'. *Sociological Theory* 16 (3): 239–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00055.

Trauner, Florian. 2016. 'Asylum Policy: The EU's "Crises" and the Looming Policy Regime Failure'. *Journal of European Integration* 38 (3): 311–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2016.1140756.

Trauner, Florian, and Helena Carrapiço. 2012. 'The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs after the Lisbon Treaty: Analysing the Dynamics of Expansion and Diversification'. *European Foreign Affairs Review* 17 (Special). https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Foreign+Affairs+Review/17.2/EERR2012011.

Trauner, Florian, and Ariadna Ripoll Servent. 2016. 'The Communitarization of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Why Institutional Change Does Not Translate into Policy Change'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 54 (6): 1417–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12397.

Weinar, Agnieszka, Saskia Bonjour, and Lyubov Zhyznomirska, eds. 2018. *The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe*. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315512853.

Zardo, Federica. 2017. 'Migration, Mobility and the Challenge of Co-Ownership Exploring European Union-Tunisia Post-Revolutionary Agenda'. *European Foreign Affairs Review* 22 (1): 75–89.

Zardo, Federica, and Chiara Loschi. 2020. 'EU-Algeria (Non)Cooperation on Migration: A Tale of Two Fortresses'. *Mediterranean Politics* 0 (0): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1758453.

Zincone, Giovanna, Rinus Penninx, and Maren Borkert. 2011. *Migration Policymaking in Europe: The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past and Present*. Amsterdam University Press.

Zolberg, Aristide R. 1989. 'The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World'. *International Migration Review* 23 (3): 403–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/019791838902300302.

7. Annex

Table A-1 Descriptive statistics, internal and external policy indicators

	Policy indicator	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Source
Internal	Border policy	961	7.71	8.04	–4	36	DEMIG-Quantmig policy database (2021)
	Admission policy	961	–8.70	10.53	–42.63	17.83	DEMIG-Quantmig policy database (2021)
	Integration policy	961	–9.89	11.89	–52.53	17	DEMIG-Quantmig policy database (2021)
	Return policy	961	7.25	10.36	–10.50	49.5	DEMIG-Quantmig policy database (2021)
External	Visa policy	961	0.60	0.14	0.35	1	DEMIG Visa, own extention (2021)
	Resettlement policy	961	373.21	982.81	0	9640	UNHCR (2021)
	Readmission policy	961	15.98	12.64	0	60	Cassarino (2019), own extension
	Aid policy	961	.0019	.0024	0	.0136	OECD/DAC (2021)
	Peacekeeping	961	.0003	.0006	0	.0047	IPI Peacekeeping Database

Table A-2 Temporal interlinkages between internal migration policies

DV: Policy area	(1) Border	(2) Admission	(3) Integration	(4) Return
Border		–0.245***	–0.0577	0.416***
		(0.0858)	(0.0847)	(0.0951)
Temporal lag 1 Border		0.00375	0.0452	–0.185
		(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.135)
Temporal lag 2 Border		–0.109	–0.0242	–0.0216
		(0.0860)	(0.0848)	(0.0960)
Admission	–0.210*		0.280***	–0.257**
	(0.126)		(0.0984)	(0.113)
Temp. lag 1 Admission	–0.0843		0.00622	0.144
	(0.182)		(0.142)	(0.162)
Temp. lag 2 Admission	–0.279**		0.163*	–0.207*
	(0.126)		(0.0978)	(0.112)
Integration	0.107	0.344***		–0.0185
	(0.147)	(0.116)		(0.131)
Temp. lag 1 Integration	0.0434	0.0105		0.135
	(0.200)	(0.159)		(0.178)
Temp. lag 2 Integration	–0.217	0.0909		–0.194
	(0.140)	(0.111)		(0.125)
Return	–0.0406	–0.284**	0.183	
	(0.145)	(0.116)	(0.114)	
Temporal lag 1 Return	0.139	–0.0257	–0.0187	
	(0.203)	(0.163)	(0.160)	
Temporal lag 2 Return	0.192	0.0712	–0.230**	
	(0.139)	(0.111)	(0.109)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.0930***	–0.0192	–0.0607***	0.0248
	(0.0239)	(0.0195)	(0.0199)	(0.0221)
Observations	899	899	899	899
R-squared	0.525	0.633	0.456	0.410
Countries	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A-3 Spatial interlinkages of external migration policies with internal migration policy aggregate

DV: Policy area	(1) Readmission	(2) Visa	(3) Resettlement	(4) Readmission	(5) Visa	(6) Resettlement
Spatial effect				0.713***	0.507***	0.273***
				(0.0174)	(0.0304)	(0.0295)
Readmission		–0.499***	0.271***		–0.172***	0.171***
		(0.0318)	(0.0387)		(0.0341)	(0.0386)
Visa	–0.423***		–0.0199	–0.137***		0.0549
	(0.0270)		(0.0366)	(0.0175)		(0.0359)
Resettlement	0.186***	–0.0162		0.0418**	0.0763***	
	(0.0266)	(0.0297)		(0.0163)	(0.0266)	
Aid	0.418***	0.329***	0.328***	0.0455	0.278***	0.245***
	(0.0570)	(0.0627)	(0.0699)	(0.0352)	(0.0551)	(0.0674)
Peacekeeping	–0.154***	–0.131***	0.0765**	0.0689***	–0.206***	0.0977***
	(0.0264)	(0.0289)	(0.0323)	(0.0166)	(0.0257)	(0.0310)
All internal policies	–0.262***	0.308***	0.181***	0.141***	0.0614	0.234***
	(0.0391)	(0.0422)	(0.0479)	(0.0253)	(0.0399)	(0.0461)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.0116	0.0116	–0.00787	–0.0210*	0.0187	–0.0146
	(0.0199)	(0.0216)	(0.0240)	(0.0119)	(0.0190)	(0.0230)
Observations	961	961	961	961	961	961
R-squared	0.458	0.368	0.119	0.808	0.514	0.194
Countries	31	31	31	31	31	31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A-1 Visa policy restrictiveness in percentage nationalities requiring entry visa



Data source: DEMIG Visa (2014), amended by visa data for 2020. Interpolation for the period 2014-2019.

Figure A-2 Trends in readmission policy, no. of readmission agreements in place, by country



Data source: Cassarino (2020), own elaboration of additions.

Figure A-3 Number of resettled persons, by country



Data source: UNHCR (2021)

Figure A-4 Aid disbursement as proportion of GDP, by donor country



Data source: OECD/DAC (2021)